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At the beginning of October 2018, Poland’s Prosecutor General submitted a
request to the Constitutional Tribunal to examine the compliance of Article 267
TFEU with the Polish Constitution, so far as it allows the referral of preliminary
questions regarding the organization of the national judiciary. The news about
this incident went to the public two weeks later, just before elections to the local
government. Formally, the request is an extension of the application submitted to the
Constitutional Tribunal in August 2018 (case K 7/18) in response to the preliminary
questions submitted to the CJEU by the Polish Supreme Court (C-522/18 and
C-537/18). The earlier application concerns the constitutionality of Article 267 TFEU,
allowing – in view of the Prosecutor General – the national courts to refer preliminary
questions bearing no relevance to the subject matter of the main case.
In the application dated October 4, 2018, the Prosecutor General demands that
the Constitutional Tribunal declare the unconstitutionality of Article 267 TFEU
“so far as it permits the national court to submit preliminary references on the
interpretation of the Treaties or on the validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union in matters relating to the
system, form and organization of the judiciary as well as proceedings before judicial
authorities of the EU Member State”.
The motion to the Constitutional Court deserves urgent attention for a number of
reasons. Undoubtedly, it is another manifestation of the deterioration of Poland’s
relations with the EU and the adoption of Poland’s hard line in its relations with the
EU. There is not much exaggeration in the statements of Polish commentators that
this is the prelude to Polexit or "setting a bomb under Polish membership in the EU”.
Without going into the far-reaching intentions of the Prosecutor General, it can be
stated that the expected judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal would allow the
Polish authorities to disregard the preliminary ruling issued by the CJEU in response
to questions referred by the Supreme Court in August 2018.
The relatively easy identification of motives underlying the application does not,
however, exclude the need for analysis and evaluation of the contents of the
application, i.e. the demand for a ruling on non-compliance of Article 267 TFEU, as
well as the argumentation used as justification for this task.
Before that, however, it is worth making two remarks about the role of the main
actors in this case: the applicant and the Constitutional Tribunal.
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Influence and Competence
The first remark concerns the very strong position of the Minister of Justice in Polish
politics, who, in the discussed case, acts as the Prosecutor General. He manages
the common courts through subordinate court presidents. Most members of the
new National Council of the Judiciary are associated with him professionally or
personally. This also applies to judges who are members of the newly created
Supreme Court’s Disciplinary Chamber, half of whom are former prosecutors. As the
Prosecutor General, he can give instructions to all prosecutors who can take part in
all court and administrative proceedings in Poland, and he can take over all cases
run by subordinate prosecutors.
Recently, the Minister of Justice has also been directing the Polish policy towards
the EU.  At the beginning of October 2018, at the Council of the European Union, he
vetoed the adoption of an annual report on the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.
A further manifestation of Poland’s collision course towards the EU is evidenced by
the application in question.
The second remark concerns the role of the Constitutional Tribunal in the discussed
case. Due to the competences of the Constitutional Tribunal, the proceedings
in this case should be discontinued. Jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional
Tribunal includes the examination of the conformity of acts of parliaments and other
normative acts, including international agreements, with the Constitution. However,
as the analysis of the motion in question shows, the Prosecutor General does not
challenge the normative contents of Article 267 TFEU. In fact, he challenges the
manner in which the Polish courts exercise their competence to refer preliminary
questions to the CJEU.
It should be noted, that challenging the constitutionality of Article 267 TFEU is
another doubtful example of improper use of the Constitutional Tribunal to settle
political disputes or legal controversies. This practice consists in the artificial
formulation of ad hoc constitutional problems, so that they are formally suitable for
recognition by the Constitutional Tribunal. The result of such operations is judgments
containing sentences that are specially "sculpted" for immediate political need. It
is significant that these artificially created cases were brought to the Constitutional
Tribunal by groups of MPs from the ruling party (sic!) or by the Prosecutor General.
Typical examples of such practices are cases concerning: procedure for selecting
candidates for the position of the First President of the Supreme Court and the
National Council of the Judiciary (K 3/17, K 5/17), the application of the act of pardon
by the President (K 7/17, K 8/17, Kpt 1/17, K 9/17), evaluating the correctness of
the election process with regard to a judge, the President and the Vice-President of
the Constitutional Tribunal (K 10/17) and the possibility of invoking the conscience
clause while providing services (K 16/17). In the light of previous practice it is
likely that the case discussed here will join the infamous list of artificial creation of
constitutional review and the Constitutional Tribunal will examine the motion of the
Prosecutor General to the substance.
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The truth is however that the Prosecutor General is dissatisfied with the preliminary
questions referred by Polish courts and wants to eliminate them using the authority
of the Constitutional Tribunal. The list of cases concerning the independence of
the Polish judiciary is growing quickly in Luxembourg, i.e. C-522/18 (D#) C-537/18
(Krajowa Rada S#downictwa), C-558/18 (Miasto #owicz), C-563/18 (Prokuratura
Okr#gowa w P#ocku), C-585/18 (Krajowa Rada S#downictwa i in.), C-623/18
(Prokuratura Rejonowa w S#ubicach), C-624/18 (CP), C-625/18 (DO).
It is therefore possible that the Constitutional Tribunal would consider the case
admissible and issue a judgment declaring Article 267 TFEU unconstitutional, in
scope challenged by the Prosecutor General. These are the expectations of many
commentators. This clearly testifies to the fall of the authority of the constitutional
court in Poland, the body that should safeguard the compatibility of the legal order
with the Constitution.
It is obvious that the Tribunal should not engage in a substantive review of Article
267 TFEU also for other reasons. It should be recalled that the legal construction
of the preliminary ruling (former Article 234 EC Treaty) has already been subject
to constitutional review in a case regarding the Accession Treaty (K 18/04). The
Prosecutor General’s arguments to justify a re-examination of Article 267 TFEU are
inconclusive. According to the settled case law of the Constitutional Tribunal, the
case shall be discontinued if there are no new circumstances justifying constitutional
review of a provision that the Tribunal has already examined.
The admissibility of the application submitted by the Prosecutor General and
reviewing the constitutionality of one of the most fundamental provisions of the
Treaty, would amount not only to a violation of EU law, but also the infringement of
the Polish Constitution. It would be incompatible with Article 9 of the Constitution,
stating that the Republic of Poland shall respect international law binding upon it.
In particular, it applies to international agreements transferring the competence of
organs of State authority in relation to certain matters to an international organization
or international institution (Article 90 of the Constitution).
Argumentative Cherry Picking
The main argument of the Prosecutor General concerns the competence of
the national courts to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU. According to the
applicant, national courts exercise wide discretion to submit preliminary references
in areas reserved for competences of the constitutional organs of the State. The
Prosecutor General argues that issues relating to the system, form and organization
of the judiciary, as well as judicial procedures, have not been transferred to the EU
in the Accession Treaty. According to the Constitution, this competence still belongs
to the organs of State authorities, particularly to the national parliament. The State
benefits from institutional autonomy in this area.
In view of the Prosecutor General, after the accession of Poland to the EU, the
competence of national courts has been extended as regards the scope of the
preliminary questions that may be referred to the CJEU. In his opinion, many
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questions do not relate to EU law. As an example, he mentioned the questions
referred by the Supreme Court and other Polish courts in recent months. According
to the applicant, it amounts to the extension of the Union’s competences without
observing the required constitutional procedures. In consequence, courts referring
preliminary questions to the CJEU, concerning the system, form and organization of
the judiciary, as well as judicial procedures, violate the Polish Constitution since the
competences in question belong to the national law-making authority.
The reasoning given by the Prosecutor General deserves a critical assessment.
His arguments are formulated in a general way, giving the impression that they
relate to all EU Member States, although similar allegations were not raised in other
countries.
It seems that the Prosecutor General ignores EU law or knowingly passes its
important aspects in silence. In particular, this relates to the main argument of
the alleged extension of the scope of application of Article 267 TFEU by the
national courts referring preliminary rulings. He does not take into account that the
admissibility of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling is not decided by the
national courts but the CJEU before adjudicating on the substance. Claiming that
the scope of Article 267 TFEU has changed on the grounds that Polish courts have
made inquiries with widely-formulated questions is not justified. It happens of course
that national courts refer questions going beyond the interpretation or validity of EU
law. However, the last word belongs to the CJEU that may consider a given case
inadmissible.
In addition, the general qualification of organization of the judiciary and judicial
procedures as matters falling within the exclusive competence of State authorities is
incorrect. The organizational and procedural autonomy of the Member States is not
absolute and does not keep cases from the influence of EU law. This is especially
evident in relation to judicial procedures. It is enough to point out the cooperation
of the EU Member States in criminal and civil matters. Moreover, while applying
judicial procedures, national courts are bound by the principle of equivalence and
effectiveness in cases with EU law elements (e.g. Arcor, C-422/04)
It is significant that arguing about the system and organization of the national
judiciary, the Prosecutor General does not mention in one word the independence
of the courts, the irremovability of judges and their accountability to disciplinary
authorities. These are undoubtedly elements of the system and organization of
the national judiciary falling within the scope of EU law (Article 2 TEU, Article 19
TEU, Article 47 of the CFR), which was emphasized in the latest jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice (e.g. Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16;
Achmea, C-284/16; LM, C-216/18 PPU). The Prosecutor General omits this case
law entirely. Therefore, his argument concerning the inadmissibility of preliminary
references concerning system, form and organization of the judiciary as well as
proceedings before judicial authorities, does not hold water.
Triggering the proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal concerning Article 267
TFEU should be critically assessed in view of EU law. National courts, including
constitutional courts, have no competence to provide final interpretation of Article
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267 TFEU in an autonomous manner and independent from interpretation given by
the CJEU. Such an interpretation by the Constitutional Tribunal would be inevitable
if it were to adjudicate on the compliance of Article 267 TFEU with the Polish
Constitution. However, such a solution would be unacceptable under EU law. It is
the CJEU that has the power to make a definitive and binding interpretation of the
Treaty. Allowing the national courts to set aside provisions of the Treaty would be
incompatible with the principle of uniform application of EU law in all Member States.
Apocalypse Tomorrow?
It is worth considering the consequences of the future judgment of the Constitutional
Tribunal in case it accepts the arguments presented by the Prosecutor General.
Firstly, state authorities could refuse to recognize the judgements issued by the
CJEU in response to the preliminary questions referred by Polish courts since
August 2018. In consequence, judgments concerning the system, form and
organization of the judiciary would not have any legal effect in Poland to the extent
that they are incompatible with the Constitution. They would not impose the need to
change Polish law, nor can they be taken into account when issuing judgments by
national courts.
Secondly, in the future, Polish authorities could decide with a large margin of
discretion which judgments of the CJEU fall within the scope of the matters covered
by the judgment issued by the Constitutional Tribunal and draw the consequences
outlined above. As a result, Article 267 TFEU would be treated by the Polish
authorities as binding only in a limited, not clearly defined scope.
Thirdly, Polish courts referring preliminary questions relating to the judiciary, would
have to take into account that their actions would be treated as violations of the
Constitution. Undoubtedly, this would not be an obstacle in view of EU law to
refer new cases to the CJEU (e.g. Melki and Abdeli, C-188/10; A v. B, C-112/13;
Križan, C-416/10), but judgments issued in response to preliminary references
could not be recognized in Poland. In turn, judges who refer preliminary questions
and subsequently issue respective judgments could face disciplinary proceedings
alleging the breach of the Constitution.
Fourthly, the discussed future judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal would result in
a new situation of Poland as a Member State. One of the most important provisions
of primary EU law, having a great contribution in the development of this area of
law, would be applied in this Member State in a narrower scope than in others. This
would amount to the departure from the principle of uniform application of EU law in
all Member States. As a result, Poland would find itself in a situation of a Member
State permanently violating not only Article 267 TFEU, but also the principle of loyal
cooperation expressed in Article 4 paragraph 3 TEU. The inevitable consequence of
such state of affairs would be a proceeding based on Article 258 TFEU, followed by
the judgment issued by the CJEU declaring that Poland has breached its obligations
arising from the Treaties.
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It is difficult to imagine that the situation described above could be tolerated by the
EU. It may lead to a serious breach of the values specified in Article 2 TEU and the
initiation of the proceedings referred to in Article 7 TEU.
The vision presented above may seem apocalyptic. Unfortunately, it is an entirely
probable scenario if the Polish Constitutional Tribunal were to issue a judgment
declaring the incompatibility of Article  267 TFEU with the Constitution in the scope
contested by the Prosecutor General. He is aware of the consequences of his
application, although probably not in all details. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor
General is guided by political motives. Perhaps the situation will change in the
light of one recent event: the interim order of the CJEU (Commission v. Poland,
C-619/18). This should force the state authorities to think about their future policy
towards the EU in general.
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